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Chapter One The Problem
Background of the Study
The provision of moral education has long been regarded
as a basic function of schools in Hong Kong. it is consi¬
dered just as important, if not more so, as the teaching
of academic knowledge. Because of the increasing juvenile
crime rate (Juvenile Crime Study Report, 1981), educators
(Moral Education, 1980), sociologists, the education
department and other interested bodies (Triad Influence in
Schools, 1981) spent much time and effort hoping to find the
underlying causes, preventive methods and remedial measures.
They unanimously advocated the strengthening of moral
education. However, Ng (1975) pointed out that the family
had lost its prime function in providing a proper moral and
value education. The blame was put on the extended family
being substituted by the nuclear family, both parents going
out to work and a decrease in respect for parents (Juvenile
Crime Study Report, 1981). So, schools, unavoidably, have
to shoulder more responsibility in moral education. Pains¬
taking work has already Started in June, 1982, to experiment
with and hence establish a moral education program to be
used by the local schools (Wealth and Life, 1982).
Moral education is important and the implementation of
moral education should not be a trial-and-error game.
Although the Chinese ancestors have passed along voluminous
moral philosophy, systematic and objective moral education
models or tests are not available (Lev;, 1981, p. 3) Lew
(1981) pointed out the necessity of a moral development
theory, and the feasibility of borrowing models already
established by the western psychologists. Educationists
have already started studying various moral aspects in
Chinese adolescents. However, the instruments for moral
measurement were used without rigorously testifying their
reliability and validity. The purpose of the present study
is to examine the various characteristics of the Defining
Issues Test (DIT) (Rest, 1979b) which is a moral judgment
test widely used in the United States. It is hoped that the
research will help the development of a moral education model
by, among other means, providing a standardized and objective
moral judgment test.
An objective and standardized test of moral judgment is
especially needed for the implementation of moral education
programs. Before the implementation, an objective assessment
of the students' moral judgment is necessary so that a
program based on appropriate moral development level can be
chosen. After the implementation, the students have to be
tested to show the effectiveness of the program. Such a
moral judgment test is also essential for other educational
(Rest, 1976b, 1980b), sociological researches whenever moral
development involving judgment and action is studied.
Statement of the Problem
The present study is an empirical study of the Defining
Issues Test on Chinese students. Previous studies on the
test itself with Chinese subjects are very limited. Very
often the test is used solely as an instrument for research
of the relationship between moral judgment and variables
such as teaching methods, child rearing practices or con¬
sistency between first and third person views (Chen, 1977,
1979; Lai, 1980; Ma, 1980; Siang, 1982; Su, 1975)'. Reliabi¬
lities, item analyses and other characteristics of DIT are
rarely reported, so any cross-cultural difference may be an
artifact due to imperfection of the instrument only. In the
present study, the DIT is translated again. Item analysis
is used to pick out badly translated items, or items not
appropriate to their own stage. It is also hoped that the
result of the present research can produce some cross-
cultural information for the' future development of DIT.
The mean scores across different education
levels, correlations with IQ and other psychometric indices
of the present Chinese sample are compared with the published
data in cross-cultural analysis. Moreover the metric unidi-
mensional unfolding model (Davison, 1979) is used to reveal
the stage structure of moral development in the Chinese
culture. Tests of sex differences, reliability, fakability
and other item characteristics of the DIT are replicated and
analyzed. Furthermore, bilinguals are used to determine the
equivalence between the Chinese and English version of
the test.
Chapter Two Review of Literature
S I rrn i f i pnnp nf Mnrl 1T1 ic rrmpn+-
As pointed out by Lew (1981, p.27), a moral action is a
result of moral judgment which is in turn a consequence of
moral cognition. Although moral judgment is only a
prerequisite, but not sufficient, condition for moral action,
it is the most important and widely studied factor among the
many identifiable factors determining a moral action. Moral
judgment and moral action are different in that the former
shows hierachical integration, that is, once a stage in
moral judgment is reached, it will never be lost.
Hundreds of researches have been carried out to studv
the relationship between moral action and moral judgment
(Blasi, 1980; Candee Kohlberg, 1981; Saltzstein Diamond,
1972; Turiel Rothman, 1972). •In most of the studies on
the relationship between delinquency and moral judgment
(Campagna Harter, 1975; Copeland Parish, 1979; Eshel et
al., 1968; Fleetwood Parish, 1976; Foder, 1972, 1973;
Hudgins Prentice, 1973; Jurkovic, 1980; Jurkovic
Prentice, 1974; Museen et al., 1970; Ruma 9 Mosher, 1976),
significant relations were found. The researches support
the belief that delinquent individuals tend to use lower
modes of moral reasoning.
Testing Moral Judgment and Values
Attempts to measure moral judgment and values were
extensive. Some focused on moral behaviour such as resis¬
tance to temptation, social behaviour and drug addiction
(Alterman et al., 1978), while others assessed attitudes
toward single moral values, such as honesty or aggression.
In a literature review, Pittel and Mendelsohn (1966)
pointed out that the earliest study of a moral judgment test
might date back to Osborne in 1894, who attempted to dis¬
cover the ethical content of children 's minds by an open-
ended questionaire. The children were asked to state acts
a child had to do in order to be called good or bad.
The second attempt was made by Sharp (1898) who
provided his subjects with 10 hypothetical dilemmal situa¬
tions. The subjects 'were asked to justify specific questions
about the moral issues with an essay. However they had to
estimate the time required to arrive at their judgments,
and the certainty of which each judgment was made.
From then onwards to the early 1930s, paper-and-pencil
assessment devices had been constructed to differentiate
between subjects with high moral standards and those with
delinquent or criminal tendencies. All these instruments,
collectively known as the Tests of Moral Knowledge, were
aiming at predicting behaviour in conduct tests. However,
to the disappointment of the psychologists, the correlations
of these tests with behavioural measures of honesty, inhi-
bitions, cooperation, and the like were low (Hartshorne 9
May, 1930). To some extent, the authors of these tests
seemed to accept the idea that morally relevant behaviour
was determined by moral knowledge and beliefs. Taking this
concept to an extreme, Mailer (1944) argued that test items
should be chosen based on their predictive validity.
After the 1930s, the atheoretical instruments were
replaced by scales with broader theoretical orientations.
A shift had been initiated by Piaget (1932) who was more
concerned with formal aspects of the child 's moral behaviour.
The children were presented with story pairs from which they
had to compare the evilness of the act. The assessment was
made according to whether the motives or material results
of the act was the children's main concern in their judgment.
Piaget was also the first one who emphasized the develop¬
mental nature of the cognitive component of moral judgment.
His influence was so great that even in recent years inves¬
tigators were still modifying Piaget 's technique, trying to
make it more amenable to objective procedures of administra¬
tion and scoring (Costanzo et al., 1973).
The measurement of moral judgment was influenced by the
introduction of the psychoanalytical and behavioristic
models. Individual differences in many dimensions of per¬
sonality were tapped and intercorrelated. As a result,
stated moral values, the feeling of subjects violating
moral prohibitions, and the tendencies to violate such
prohibitions were all incorjjorated into one test instrument.
The characteristics of the early period such as the concern
for the correctness of moral values and the notion of direcl
behavioural prediction from moral knowledge faded slowly.
Generalized trait and dynamic concepts like superego, con¬
science or character were brought in and combined into the
moral attitude measurement.
The prevalent characteristic of the instruments in the
1950s was the use of projective technique (Magowan Lee,
1970), with the story-completion approach being the most
extensively used. Other variations were the puppet-play
pictures. However in none of the projective techniques had
moral value been differentiated from other components of
superego or from the consequence of moral transgression.
The authors of the tests considered superego as a unique
dimension. They believed that when superego was strong,
values were strong, controls were strong and moral conse¬
quences like guilt were strong. This implied that a test
tapping any one of these variables would be equivalent to
the tests on all other variables.
In one way or the other the above mentioned assessment
techniques were imperfect (Pittel Mendelsohn, 1966):
1. The instrument assessed things other than moral
judgment or values.
2. The scoring was based on normative or other evalua¬
tive moral standards set up by the investigators
themselves.
3. Subjective scoring procedures and ratings were linkec
to and relied on external societal normative stan¬
dards.
4. Abstract unrealistic situations were employed.
5. Only a small number of moral or ethical areas were
s ampled.
6. Moral attitude strength was inferred from behaviour
and affective responses.
7. In the tests, subjects were tempted to show only the
the socially desirable responses.
8. The validity and reliability of the tests vere not
reported.
Kohlbera's Test of Moral Judgment
In the study of moral development, Lawerence Kohlberg
is considered (Lickona, 1976, p.4) the only contemporary
psychologist who embraces philosophy as important and
essential in the defining of what is moral. Kohlberg holds
that moral action itself is immaterial whereas the under¬
standing and the belief behind the action are paramount.
As an enthusiastic reader of Piaget (Kohlberg J Kramer,
1969), Kohlberg understands that the superego formation is
pretty well completed by the age of 6 while the autonomous
morality will be completed by the age of 12 or 13. On
closer examination of the responses of his subjects between
age 12 and 16, he realizes that children have a long way
to go beyond Piaget's autonomous stage to reach moral
maturity. Accordingly the six-stage scheme of moral deve¬
lopment is constructed (Kohlberg, 1958, 1969, 1971, 1973,
1976), a summary of which is presented in Appendix A.
Though Kohlberg's test paradigm did generate a great
deal of research, its theoretical basis had been under
constant scrutiny (Kurtins Greif, 1974). Using Kohlberg's
moral judgment interview (MJI), Kuhn (1976) found that the
progress in stage within a six month interval was insigni¬
ficant, while upward movement over one year was significant.
However the variance of the stage progression in the kinder¬
garten to second grade students was very great. When
compared vith a control group, the influence of repeated
testing was also significant. In another study (Holstein,
197 6), it was estimated that children at the age of .13 moved
1 to 3 stages within 3 years.'
Kohlberg's test was found to be correlated signifi¬
cantly with moral behaviour. Kreb and Rosenwald (1977)
asked subjects solicited through newspapers to mail back
completed questionaires on trust. The investigators found
that Kohlberg 's test was appropriate in predicting low key
unemotional moral conflict. The person's stage of moral
development determined how he would conceptualize the
dilemma facing him. However, the interaction between the
situation and the moral judgment was also critical in
determining the subject 's choice of action (Erkut, Jaquette
St Staub, 1981; McGeorge, 1974).
Though Kohlberg's intital definition of moral stages
was independent of the moral choice, different researches
(Candee, 1976; Rest, 1981) showed a significant correlation
between moral judgment and moral choice. When questions on
situations in which procedural rights were in conflict with
loyalty such as in the Watergate affair, subjects at higher
stages made decisions that were consistent with human rights
and less often with those maintaining conventions or insti¬
tutions. This meant that people at the highest stage should
reach the same moral reasoning and choice.
The stage sequence of moral development was suxjported
by exposing subjects with moral reasoning either one stage
above or below their own (Turiel, 19 66; Turiel St Rothman,
1972; Walker, 1982). It was found that subjects showed
significant progress under the +1 treatment.
In spite of all the promising results of numerous
researches, Kohlberg's test had its weakness. The test-
re test reliability was low for the dilemmas together or
individually (Moran Joniak, 1979; Rubin St Trotter, 1977).
Scores attained on items within each dilemma had been inter-
correlated but the correlations were low and insignificant.
Rubin and Trotter also showed that the children got signi¬
ficantly higher moral levels in the multiple choice scale
than in the verbal version, thus implying an underestimation
of low verbal ability subjects.
Kohlberg was challenged not only for his test, his
fundamental stage concept (Colby Kohlberg, 1981) had also
been attacked. Siegal (1980) thought that Kohlberg's model
was but a modest improvement of Piaget's. The invariant
sequence for three or four stages might be valid, however
the generality and invariance of six stages were questionable.
In conclusion, Siegal did not agree that Kohlberg's model was
superior and more sophisticated than Piaget's.
Likewise, the last two stages of Kohlberg's model were
criticized (Gibbs, 1977; Murphy Gilligan, 1980) because of
their rarity and their claim of representing a morally and
structurally higher form of reasoning. The first four stages
might meet the criteria for a naturalistic developmental
sequence, however the later two stages appeared to be only
existential or reflective extensions of the earlier stages.
Rest's Defining Issues Test
In Kohlberg 's test, moral judgment is assessed by
asking the subjects to generate their own responses to moral
dilemmas (Colby et al., 1982; Porter Taylor, 1972). Rest
(1975) argued that moral judgment could also be assessed by
requesting the subjects to make judgments about the moral
judgments of others. When faced with a dilemma in our daily
life, the taking or not taking of another's advice is in
fact making judgments about moral judgments. Eased on this
belief. Rest constructed the Defining Issues Test (DIT)
(Rest, 1976a, 1979a, 1979b, Rest et al., 1969; Rest et al.,
1974) which was a standardized objectively scored test.
In the DIT, the subjects are presented with 6 dilemmas
each of which is accompanied by 12 statements. The state¬
ments define various main issues of the dilemma. The
subject 's task is to rate and rank the issue statements
according to his perceived.importance when making a decision
about the dilemma.
Although only a few dilemmas in the DIT have been modified
from Kohlberg's test, there are fundamental differences between
the two tests. Kohlberg's test yields a global stage for a
subject whereas the DIT gives a subject 's relative importance
of using the principled stages. Another major difference is
that Kohlberg's test is a production task, subjects have to
generate their own moral judgments in answering the open-
ended questions. However the DIT is a recognition task, the
subjects only have to judge the relative importance of the
given statements. As recognition is an easier task than
production, DIT can detect in subjects the higher forms of
moral thinking earlier than using Kohlberg's test. Rest also
has the confidence that the DIT is superior because in many
real life situations, people have to recognize and appreciate
moral judgments rather than to produce spontaneous moral
judgments of their own. Thus the DIT should not be consi¬
dered simply as an easier way of assessing moral judgments.
The validity of the DIT has been supported by comparing
test scores with those from the Kohlberg test, the Social-
Moral Concept and the Law and Order Attitude Test (Rest et
al., 1974). In a two year longitudinal study, an increase
in higher scores was found (Rest, 1975). Though the corre¬
lation of the P-score with age was relatively high (.62),
formal education seemed to be a more prominent factor in
increasing the P-score.
Replications showed confirmative and supportive results.
Changes in the direction predicted by Kohlberg's model were
evident in the many cross-sectional, longitudinal and sequen¬
tial studies (Davison Robbins, 1978; Martin, Shafto A
Vandeinse, 1977; Rest, 1975; Rest, Davison A Robbins, 1978).
Although the DIT can be used to verify a lot of the
characteristics and inferences from Kohlberg is model, the
test is not a perfect moral scale. Two one-way analyses of
variance showed 6 inconsistent items among the 72 in the
whole test (Martin et al., 1977). The test was also
criticized because of the fewer stage 2 and 6 items. The
lack of stage 1 items and the language sophistication of the
test make the test unable to be used in primary schools and
with low stage subjects. The test was also challenged
(Martin et al., 1977; Rest, 1980a, 1981) because action
choice (i.e. choice of action in the dilemma) might influence
the ranking of statements (i.e. reasons for action) which in
turn would affect the P-score.
In the scoring procedure, the original P-score was
questioned because the P-score considered only the rankings
of the responses but ignored the ratings. There is a shift
to the use of an empirical weighted sura scoring method taking
into account all the ratings of the statements (Davison
Robbins, 1978).
Recent Directions of Moral Judcrrnent Research
As Kohlberg (Rest, 1979a) viewed his research, dating
from 1955, it had undergone two phases of development. In
the first phase, sufficient evidence of broad outlines of
culturally universal qualitative patterns of moral judgment
development were gathered. Though the instrument Kohlberg
used in his 1958 dissertation showed good inter-rater
reliability, he and Rest agreed to construct, in the second
phase, a more valid and reliable test of moral judgment.
Two groups carried out quite independent researches at
Harvard and Minnesota. At Harvard University, the construc¬
tion went on slowly, only arriving at a standardized inter¬
view and scoring manual with acceptable reliability and
validity. On the other hand, at the University of Minnesota,
an objective type moral judgment test was made available
by James Rest. This test provided a much broader and
voluminous data base for moral judgment than did the Kohlberg
test.
As Rest (1979a) has described, the recent major
activities are outgrowths of Piaget's and Kohlberg's work
can be divided into three catagories. One centre of interest
is to identify features and cues in the hypothetical stories
that affect the choices of a statement. Another major
interest is the development of new domains of social develop¬
ment. The third centre of interest is the development of a
practical and validated method for moral judgment assessment
(Gibbs, Wadaman Colby, 1982). The present study is one of
the many attempts intended to contribute to the construction
of such an instrument.
Cross-cultural Evidence of Moral Judgment and Development
The moral development model will have very limited use
if it is not culturally universal. The very first thing
-Kohlberg had done was the verification of his model in
cultures other than the United States. Researches (Bar-Yam
et al., 1980; Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg 9 Kramer, 1969; Nisan
Kohlberg, 1982; Parikh, 1980; White et al., 1975, 1978)
in Taiwan, Mexico, Turkey, Yucatan and the Bahamas showed
similar characteristics and trends in moral development.
It was interesting, though, to find that the moral develops
ment was slower in some cultures when compared with similar
age subjects in the United States. Furthermore, no signifi¬
cant difference was detected in the moral reasoning between
Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddists, Moslems and atheists
(Kohlberg, 1971, p.174). Thus Kohlberg concluded that
though cultural values and religions were important factors
in selectively elaborating certain themes in the moral life,
they were not unique causes of the development of basic
moral values.
Lei and Cheng (1982) restudied the Taiwanese society
hoping to find similarities and information among the
unscorable responses in Kohlberg's test. A significant
relation was found between the scores and school performance
but not the sex, moral conduct or sociopolitical attitudes.
Lei concluded that the Chinese responses were characterized
by the traditional concept of filial piety in particular and
affiliation in general. Reciprocity or positive desert and
serving social ideals were also related to filial piety,
while law and good group consequences were related to
-collective utilitarianism. Lei and Cheng believed that the
Chinese cultural patterning impacted more on the content
and less on structure.
Gendron (1981) using che DIT instead of the Kohlberg
test, replicated the moral judgment study on Taiwanese
samples with promising results. An increase of P-score
with education and age was found. However, the Meaningless
score (M-score) check which tried to eliminate and reject
invalid subjects, was relatively high in Gendron's samples.
The mean M score of the sample was 8.03% which almost doubled
the U. 3. A. normative data of 4.63%.
Similarly Ma (1980) carried a cross-cultural study of
moral judgment and the consistency between the first and
third person views using the DIT. There were significant
differences on more than 30% of the DIT items between the
Hong Kong and British subjects. Because of this difference,
Ma suggested a modification or reconstruction of the DIT
before using it in the Chinese culture. However his results
had to be taken cautiously .as his comparison was based on
two groups, one Chinese and one English, who were examined
on the two versions of the test independently.
Moral Judgment and IQ
Though some people may feel that morality is an affective
aspect, there are evidences showing that judgments are indeed
cognitive structures. Rest, Turiel and Kohlberg (1969) were
able to demonstrate that the ways subjects judged moral
issues were directly related to their cognitive comprehension.
Subjects with high comprehension tended to have higher DIT
scores. The second evidence came from longitudinal study in
which it was shown (Rest, 1975) that comprehension increased
with moral judgment. Fakability tests produced a third line
of support. Subjects were able to fake low but not fake high
in moral judgment tests (McGeorge, 1975), implying that DIT
scores represented the subjects' highest cognitive capacity
moral thinking. Moreover moral judgment is not simply a
person's preference for certain choice. It could hardly be
manipulated or changed by other educational intervention
s tudies.
Researches showed that the correlation of moral judgment
and IQ were moderate (Kohlberg, 1969) from .30 to .50. The
correlation of moral judgment with various tests of intellect
tual aptitude and achievement tests showed that the moral
judgment score had a higher correlation with verbal subtests
than with nonverbal subtests. However the complete, verbal
plus nonverbal, had an even higher correlation, showing that
DIT was not simply a verbal test.
Spy Difference in Mnral Judrrmenf
Though Kohlberg's model was developed based on 53 boys
(Colby et al., 1980), sex difference was seldom found in
other researches. Only two significant sex differences were
found out of the twenty-two DIT studies reviewed (Rest, 1979a,
' p. 120). Even for these two studies, only about 6% of the
variance could be accounted for by the sex variable.
However not all researchers agreed on the no sex
difference conclusion. Based on her own research, Holestein
(1976) argued that the scoring method in Kohlberg's test was
sexually biased. She criticized that Kohlberg 's stages were
originally defined and empirically tested on a sample of
males only. Emotional responses such as compassion or love
in moral judgment which contributed a great part in female
responses were not taken into consideration, and were cate-
gorized as low stages. Rest (1979a) challenged Holes tein's
findings and demanded a theoretical analysis on how stereo¬
typical females of lower stages could provide a rationale for
solving complex moral problems better than people of higher
s tages.
Standing on the side of Holestein, Gilligan (1977)
examined the sex limitation of Kohlberg's stage theory. From
her own interviews with women on contemplating abortion, she
derived a three-level and two-transaction sequence for females.
The development started with an initial concern with survival
and moved to focus on goodness followed by a guide for the
just resolution of moral conflicts. Rest (1979a, p.124) be¬
lieved that the problem of sex as a variable in Kohlberg-type
model was worth exploring, but evidence to-date was not con¬
clusive in saying that the model or the test was sexually
biased.
Fakability
The Fakability test, an important support to the construct
validity (Cronback G Meehl, 1955) of DIT will be replicated in
the present study. A theoretical assumption of the moral test
is that subjects are responding with the mcs t advanced think¬
ing of which they are cajsable, and not just a preference of
certain forms of moral judgment in the affective domain. This
assumption has been supported by various moral comprehension
tests in which subjects with low moral judgment scores showed
low comprehension in the moral statements (Rest, Turiel
Kohlberg, 1969). Based on such an assumption, it was
arg-ued (McGeorge, 197 5) that subjects could not identify or
comprehend statements of stages higher than their own.
Subjects were not capable of faking high in the testing even
if they were asked to do so. McGeorge carried out the first
research in verifying this hypothesis. He asked subjects
to fake bad, fake good or answer in normal conditions. His
study showed that subjects1 P-score did not increase signi¬
ficantly in the fake good condition. However the scores did
increase significantly in the fake bad condition. The
results are consistent with the hypothesis that moral judg¬
ment is developmental. In 1977 Bloom (Rest, 1979a, p.217)
has repeated the experiment by including conditions in which
the subjects played the role as philosopher. Results showed
that the P-score was essentially identical under standard,
fake good and philosopher instructions.
Testing the Stage Structure in Moral Develooment
Davison, working closely at the University of Minnesota
with James Rest, has contributed greatly by providing a
mathematical model for the testing of the stage structure
(Davison, 1976a, 1976b, 1977, 1979, 1980; Davison, Robbins
Swanson, 1978; Davison et al., 1980). When subjects
respond to stimuli by rank order, statistical methods can
be used to test whether the responses conform to a metric
unfolding model. The rank order responses can also be used
to test the validity of a priori stimulus ordering. The
model postulates that when the stimuli and person variables
are ordered along a single continuum, the subjects will
mostly prefer stimuli nearest their own position.
Using the model (Davison, 1977; Schonemann, 1977) and
the responses in DIT, the following are predicted:
1. The correlation of'the stage score variables should
display a simplex-like structure. In the correlation
matrix (see Table l), the correlations in any row
will decrease as one moves away from the diagonal
element in either direction. For example, for stage
Table 1
Stage Score Correlation (Davison et al.)












































Note. From Stage Structure in Objective Moral Judgments
by Davison, M. L., Robbins, S., Swanson, D. Deve1pomenta1
Psychology, 1978, ,14(2), p. 140.
3, the correlation decreases from 1 (stage 3 against
stage 3) to .59 (stage 3 against stage 4) to .19
(stage 3 against stage 6).
2. A principal components factoring of the variable
correlations should yield two factors. The inter¬
mediate stages should have the highest loadings in
the first factor while the variables will be arranged
in the stage order in the second factor.
3. Applying Schonemann (1970) metric unfolding analysis
on the variables, persons will be ordered by age
and variables by stage.
Equivalence in Translation
The technique of back translation has been recommended
(Werner Cambell, 1970) to examine the quality of a trans¬
lation. Two bilinguals are employed; the first one trans-
lates the test from the source to the target language while
the second one blindly translates back from the target to
the source language. The two versions of the test in the
source language, that is, the original and the back trans¬
lated, can then be compared. This method, however, has been
criticized (Brislin, Lonner Thorndike, 1973, p.41) because
back translator may still be able to make sense out of poor
target version. The target translation may also contain many
grammatical forms of the source language which are easy to
be back translated, but are worthless for the subjects.
Furthermore the success of this design depends ponderously
on the choice of two well trained translators.
As an alternative, the use of bilinguals has been
suggested (Brislin, Lonner Thorndike, 1973, p.45). A
group of bilinguals take the test in the two languages. The
item scores in the two language versions are then compared
by correlated t-tests. A detailed description of the
procedure has been given by Prince and Mornbour (1967):
1. a careful translation;
2. bilinguals are assigned randomly to two groups, one
group will take half of the questions in language
one, and the second half in language two; the order
is reversed for the other group;
3. the two groups are retested, each using the test of
the other group;
4. items showing discrepant response frequencies are
to be held suspect and further translation should
be made until comparable frequencies are obtained;
5. discard test items if the procedure continues to
yield discrepant responses.
In (2) the groups take the test in two languages
simultaneously to avoid the charge that high original-
translation reliability (test-retest) could be obtained
through respondent memory.
Reliability and Item Analysis
Reliability- internal consistency. internal consis¬
tency of the DIT can be calculated in a number of ways. One
can find the P-score of individual stories and determine
Cronbach's alpha for the six stories. This method gave an
alpha of .65 (Page 0 Bode, 1980) and .77 (Davison 9 Robbins,
1978). The alpha based on the 24 rankings was .49.
Reliability- test retest. As compared with Kohlberg s
test, DIT showed much higher test-retest reliabilities.
Using Kohlberg 's test, Rubin and Trotter (1977) reported a
correlation of .44 (2 weeks) while Selman and Lieberman
(1975) reported a value of .60. However with the DIT,
Davison and Robbins (1978) obtained much higher test-retest
reliabilities ranging from .71 to .82.
Item analysis. Techniques for item analyses are widely
available for evaluations of a test yielding a single score
or a set of scores. However, these methods are unsuitable
for personality and interest inventories where a profile of
scores rather than a single score is attributed to each
subject. When analyzing profiles of scores, under such
circumstances, Heir and Gati (1981) suggested, together with
other tests, the use of the following criteria:
1. the item mean score should not be too extreme;
2. the standard deviation of an item score should
indicate enough dispersion;
t,
3. the correlation between an item and its scale should
be high while correlation with other scales should be
low;
4. the items in the same scale should show enough homo-
genity; Cronbach s alpha (1951) of subscales should
not be seriously affected when an item is deleted.
Chapter Four Methodology
Definition
Moral judgment. Moral judgment is the concern with how
the benefits and burdens of social comprehension are to be
distributed. It is the understanding of the rules of a
social system that assign people's rights and responsibilities
(Rest, 1979a, p.20). In .the present study, moral judgment
'is measured by the P, D and stage scores (ranking, rating)
in the DIT.
Moral development. Moral development is the successive
conceptions of a) how mutual expectations among cooperating
individuals are established, and b) how the interests of
individuals are to be equilibrated. In the present cross-
sectional study, it is presented by the changein P, D and
stage score (rating) in DIT by age.
Age-education group. In the present study, students
are grouped together according to the education level.
However, unavoidably, these groups are also different in age.
The groups are used more like criterion groups in which the
group with higher education is more advanced in development.
The effect of age and education will not be disentangled in
this study. A comparison of the age and education effect
is detailed in the 'Results 1 and 'Discussion' sections.
Hypotheses
The following are hypothesized:
1. there is no significant difference in moral judgment
among different age-education groups;
2. there is no significant correlation between moral
judgment and ICJ;
3. there is no sex difference in moral judgment among
different age-education groups;
4. there is no significant increase in moral judgment
in a fake-good setting.
Instrumentation
Defining Issues Test. The DIT by Rest (Appendix B) is
translated into Chinese (Appendix C) under the supervision
of Dr. J. F. Lew. During the translation, references were
made to the previous Chinese translation (Lai, 1981; Ma,
1980; Sianb, 1982). The instrument consists of 6 moral
dilemmas each accompanied by 12 statements related to the
main issues of the dilemma. Take the first dilemma which is
modified from Kohlberg's test as an example. In the dilemma,
a husband, Heinz, has to decide whether he should steal an
exorbitantly priced drug for his dying wife. The subject is
asked to consider such issues as whether or not a com¬
munity's laws are going to be upheld, Isn't it only
natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife
that he'd steal? Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as
a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the
drug might help? etc. For each of these 12 issues in the
dilemma, the subject has to indicate how important each issue
is in deciding what ought to be done. A Likert scale of
importance( 'most', 'much', 'some', 'little', 'no') is used.
At the end of each dilemma, the subject has to rank his four
choices of the most important issues.
The issues or statements are written to exemplify the
reasoning of a certdiin stage of moral judgment. Care is
taken so that a particular statement will only be chosen by
subjects of the corresponding stages. The word length,
complexity of syntax, and use of technical or unusual terms
are matched in all the issues. Nonsense items (M items)
using high sounding phrases are used to eliminate subjects
who choose issues on the basis of complex abstruse verbiage
rather than on meaning.
To summarize the ratings and rankings in the dilemmas,
four indices of moral maturity are used. Their respective
calculation methods and formulae are detailed in the section
'data analysis
Raven Progressive Matrices Test. The IQ of the subjects
are measured by the standard Raven Progressive Matrices Test
(Raven, 1975). This test is used because it is a culture-
free intelligence test. Furthermore this test has been
quite extensively used in Hong Kong, and a local norm has
been established by the Education Research Establishment
(Hong Kong Education Department). Most psychologists also
believe that the Raven Progressive Matrices Test is a singl
test most saturated with the general factor (g~factor)
. (Anastasi, 1976, p. 293).
In the test the subjects are given 5 subtests each of
which contains 12 matrices. The subjects have to choose a
matrix from 8 options so that it fits in with the missing
part of the given matrices'.
Samplinq
Two hundred and forty™two students were used in the



















































aEducation level: Junior Sec.- F.l F.2; Middle Sec.- F.3
F.4; Senior Sec.- F.5 F.6; F.l= Grade 7, F.6= Grade 12
Actual number of students retained in the analysis
c
Percentage of students rejected in the reliability checks,
usually in the range 5 to 15% (Rest, 1979b)
Procedure
Age-education, IQ, Sex, Stage structure, Reliability
and Item Analysis. All the subjects took the full DIT under
normal classroom conditions. Sixty-eight junior secondary
school students were tested again after two weeks. Another
group of 40 F.l students took the Raven Progressive Matrices
Test after 2 days. Both tests required approximately 45
minutes to complete. The standard procedures of administra¬
tion were straightly followed as described in the manuals of
the respective tests (Raven, 1975; Rest, 1979b). The answers
were then coded and analyzed with the assistance of an IBM
3031 computer at the computer centre at the Chinese University
of Hong Kong.
During the administration of the DIT, the students were
told that the questionaire aimed at understanding how people
think about social problems. They were also told that people
often have different opinions about questions of right and
wrong, and there were no 'right 1 answers as in mathematical
problems. The word 'moral 1 was never mentioned in the ques¬
tionaire. A sample dilemma was given in the instructions to
illustrate the rating and ranking methods.
Fakability. Eighty-six F.3 students were randomly
assigned to five groups. Each group was tested twice with
a two week interval as shown in table 3 (McGeorge, 1975).
In the fake good condition, the subjects were asked to
fill in the questionaire by thinking themselves as
Table 3
Fakability: Treatments in two testings
treatment


























aFirst half of the test in Chinese, second
half in English.
someone concerned only with the very highest principles
of justice and trying to show the mature social and ethical
judgment. In the fake bad condition, the subjects were asked
to show the lowest, most immature level of social and
ethical judgment as someone with no sense of justice and
no concern for other people would fill it.
Equivalence in translation. The DIT was first trans¬
lated into Chinses based on previous Chinese translation
(Gendron, 1981; Lai, 1981; Ma, 1980; Siang, 1982). As a
preliminary step to eliminate major syntactic errors, five
Form three students were asked to read through the items
carefully and pick out phrases or sentences they could not
comprehend. The revised version was then submitted to Dr.
J. F. Lew for scrutiny and final approval.
The method recommended by Prince and Mombour (1967) was
followed. A class of F.6 students was randomly divided into
two groups. The first group took the first half of DIT in
English and the second half in Chinese; the order was
reversed for the second group. After two weeks, they were
retested using the test of the other group (see Table 4).
Th n 4-- Annlirnnr
Moral judgment. For the DIT, there are many ways of
summarizing the ranking and rating data. In the present
study, four indices: P, D, stage scores (ranking) and stage
scores (rating) are used.
Traditionally the P score is recommended. P and stage
scores (ranking) are calculated by giviiig weights of 4, 3,
2 and 1 to the issues ranked first, second, third and fourth
respectively. P is the sum of the weights attributed to
the principled stages (i.e. stage 5A, 5B, 6) while the stage
scores (ranking) are sums of weights to the items of the
respective stage (i.e. stage 2 score is the sum of weights
to stage 2 items). In this study P is represented by P%
which is the percentage of weights (total weight equals
(4+3+2+1) x 6= 60) attributed to the principled stages
and is obtained by dividing P by .60 (Rest, 1979b).
However the use of P is criticized because it incoporates
no information from issues keyed to the first three stages
(Davison 9 Robbins, 1978). Moreover the ranking method
considers the 4 items ranked most important only while
ignoring totally the ratings in the remaining 8 items. As
a result, D, a score based on the double-centering method
is generated. T0 draw more information from the ratings of
all 72 items, six stage scores (rating) are also derived
for each person by computing the average rating given by the
subject to items keyed to each of the six stages (i.e. stage
2 score is the average of ratings of stage 2 items).
The D score is calcualted based on the ratings of the
72 statements. The double centered rating method is used,
in which the rating of item j is calculated (Davison 9
Robbins, 1978; Rest, 1979a, p.237):
where ~ the importance rating given by person i to
the mean importance rating given
by person it to the n items,
the mean response to item j in
Davison's standardization sample of 1080 (N)
subjects,
~he grand mean of responses in
the standardization sample.
The empirically weighted sum
where the sum for person i,
a weight for item j, and
subject i 's double centered response to
item j.
Age-education. One-way ANOVA of the P, D, stage scores
(rating) by age-education are used. As suggested by Rest
(1979b), MANOVA of stage scores (stage 2 to 6) (rating) by
age-education is also calculated.
IQ. Pearson correlation between P and IQ (RPM) scores
is calculation.
Sex. A two-way sex by age-education ANOVA of the P,
D, stage scores (ranking, rating) is used. The interactions
and main effects are examined.
Stage structure. The metric unfolding model is used
to analyze the stage structure of the Chinese subjects. The
model (Davison, 1979) assumes that
1. stage scores are expressed on an interval scale,
2. both persons and stage variables can be assigned
scale values on an underlying continuum, and
3. for a given stage, persons with the highest scores
will be those whose level of development is nearest
that stage.
Mathematically, the subject i's score at stage j (Rest
1979a, p »226)
where a. and b. are constants associated with variablei,
J J J
e.. is an error term, x. and y. are scale values for stage
l j j 11 J
j and person i respectively.
T-tests are used to compare the stage scores (ranking)
between the present sample and those in the U.S.A. and
Taiwan (Rest et al., 1978; Gendron, 1981).
Eguivalence in translation. Correlated t-tests are
used to compare the P, D, stage scores (ranking) and item
ratings between the two languages.
Reliability and item analysis.
1. Reliability- internal consistency: Cronbach 's (1951)
alpha is calculated by regarding each story as an
individual item. Alphas are calculated for individual
subscales (stage) as well.'
2. Reliability- test retest: Pearson correlations of
P, D and stage scores (ranking, rating) between the
tvo testings are calculated.
3. Item analysis, the following criteria (Meir Gati,
1981) are used:
a. item mean score- mean of the ratings of the items
(i) should be in the range .1 to .9 for Oil,
b. item standard deviations should be greater than
.15 for 0 (i (1,
c. item scale correlation (r.)- the correlation
of item i's rating with its own stage score, s
being the mean rating of items of stage s
excluding item i,
d. alpha if item deleted- the internal consistency
alphas before and after deletion of the item are
compared.
Limitations
The present study is limited by:
1. The sample is small. It is neither a random sample of the
Chinese students nor of the Hong Kong students. Further¬
more, non-students are not included. However, previous
studies showed that the stage of moral judgment changed
little beyond adolescence. It is hoped that the study
with the present student composition can capture most of the
changes in moral judgment.
2. Moral judgment is an inside intellectual reasoning process.
In the present study, moral judgment is assessed by the
BIT which measures only one aspect of moral judgment
(Jensen, Taylor Burton, 1981; Lewin, 1977), the recog¬
nition of moral judgment, as compared with the production of
moral judgment in the Kohlberg's test.
3. In the present study, the moral development is solely
represented by Kohlberg's model. Though Kohlberg 's model
is a very important model, it is not the only model of
moral development (Armsby, 1971; Buchanan 8c Thompson, 197 3;
Bull, 1969; Damon, 1975; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979, 1981;
Eisenberg-Berg Roth, 1980; Enright et al., 1980; Hogan,
1970, 1972; Jensen, 1981; Johnson, 1962; Johnson Hogan,
1981; Tsujimoto, 1978).
4. In the cross-cultural comparison, the similarity in stage
scores (ranking) and other correlations are used to indicate
the equivalence of moral development. These indices, though
important, are just part of the factors reflecting the
moral development of the subjects.
5. In the validity analysis, due to the lack of resources, such
as established Chinese moral related tests for concurrent
validity study, fakability is used as the only validity
study of the BIT.
Chap ter Four Res u11s
Age-education
An univariate ANOVA of the P and D scores showed a
significant age-education effect; for P F (3, 238)= 12.04,
p .01; for D, F (3, 238)= 30.63, p.01 (see Table 5 and
Figure l). A posteriori comparison using Scheffe test at
.05 level showed that the P and D scores of university and
senior secondary students were significantly higher than those
of the middle and junior secondary students. Age-education
explains 12% and 23%(u)) (Linton et al., 1975) of the variance
of P and D scores respectively.
The correlations of P and D with age were high: for P,
r (24-0)= .36, p .001; for D, r (240)=. 49, p .001.
However the correlations have to be interpreted cautiously
as age and education are confounded factors in the way that
higher education levels are always associated with older age.
Thus the correlations may be a result of the education effect
only. Still the effects of age and education can be isolated
by controlling one of the two effects, that is, using students
of different education levels but with the same age, or using
students of the same education level but with different age.
However there are insufficient students with the same age for
the first method. But when the education effect is
controlled (i.e. students of the same education level are
used), it is found that correlations between moral judgment
Table 5
ANOVA of P. D, M. Stage scores (rating)
by Age-education
age-education group rneand































































Jun Sec: Junior Secondary n= 68
Mid Sec: Middle Secondary n= 71
Sen Sec: Senior Secondary n= 69
Univ: University n= 34
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and age are insignificant, indicating that age is not the
main contributor to moral judgment development (see Table 6).
A MANOVA of stage 2 to stage 6 scores (ranking, rating)
by age-education was significant; for stage score (ranking),
Pillai's (Morrison, 1978) F (18, 705)= 3. 24, £.001; for
stage score (rating), F (18, 705)= 3.48, £.001.
Detailed analyses of the differences in reasoning at
different age-education levels were obtained by univariate
ANOVA of stage scores (rating). The results showed that the
more advanced group attributed more importance to principled
moral consideration (stage 5 and 6) than the less advanced
groups; for stage 5B, 6 (rating), JF (3, 238)= 9.7 0 and 4.86
respectively, £.01. On the other hand, as expected, the
less advanced groups gave more importance to stage 2 and 3
reasoning; univariate ANOVA of stage 2 (rating), F (3, 238)=
4.33, £.01. However univariate ANOVA of stage 3, 4, 5A
and M (rating) scores do not show significant difference among
different age-education groups, F_ (3, 238)= .35, 2.39, 2.28
and .24 respectively, h.s.
TO
An intact class of 36 Form one students (M= 4.33,
-age
SD= .63) were tested with the standard Raven Progressive
Matrices Test (RPM). The mean raw score in the RPM -was
quite high (M= 50.42, SJD= 3.15) with 66% of the students
in the top 25% when compared with the standardization group,
Table 6
Correlations between
Moral Judgment and Age
Education Level




























in U. K. (Raven, 1960). The correlation between 10 (RPM)
and age was insignificant, r (34)= .067. In accord with
the cognitive developmental model of moral judgment, students
with a high level of moral judgment tended to have a high
IQ score, though the correlation was only moderate, r (34)=»
.24. The low correlation of IQ with age within an intact
class is expected. In a homogenous age group with the same
education level, age can account for only a small percentage
of the variance of 10. If a group of heterogenous age
group students was used, the correlation between age and 10
raw score, and between moral judgment and IQ would definitely
increase. A drop of correlation coefficients after control¬
ling the age effect was also reported in a DIT study by
Froming and McColgan (1979).
Sex
The results of a two-way age-education by sex ANOVA of
the P, D and stage score (ranking, rating) are shown in
Tables 7 to 10. All age-education by sex interactions were
insignificant. As expected the more advanced age-education
groups were higher in the P and D scores, F (2, 80)= 5.81
and 18.90 respectively, p.01.
In the analyses of the sex effect, different results
were obtained using the P and D scores. The females got
higher P scores than the males, F (l, 80)= 7.7 2, £.001
2
explaining 6.4% of the variance (£0); however the difference
in D scores between sex was insignificant, F (1, 80)= .86,
n. s.
Two-way age-education by sex MANOVA of the stage 2 to
6 scores (ranking, rating) (see Table 11) showed that the
sex effect was significant in the ranking scoring method
«
but not in the rating one; for the ranking scores, Pillai 's
F (12, 152)= 2.80, £.05; for the rating scores, Pillai's
F (12, 152)= .76, n.s. A detailed two-way age-education
by sex ANOVA of the individual stage scores (ranking) showed
that the males were higher in stage 4 score (ranking) but
lower in stage 5A score (ranking), F (l, 80)= 8.93, £.01,
and F (l, 80)= 5. 92, £.05 respectively. Males had a
smaller stage 5A score (ranking) which was deterministic in
the lower of P score in males. However when D score was used,
Table 7





































































ANOVA (F values) of P. M, Stage scores (ranking
by Age-education. SP?
Effect
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p
M































Means of D, M, Stage scores (rating)
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' 1 1= not important '5 1= very important
Viid Sec: n,= 23 n= 11
Sen Sec: n..= 8 n= 10II i
Univ: nx„= 20 rn,= 14Jb
Toble 10
All0VA (F_ values) of D, M, Stage scores (rating)
by Age-education, Sex
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i.e. when the ratings to all items of different stages were
taken into consideration, the difference between sexes was
insignificant. The significant differences in stage 4 and
stage 5A (ranking) reasoning were not observed in a similar
analysis of the means of stage 4 and 5A (rating). A possible
explanation is that among the thirty-six stage 4 and 5A items,
a few are ranked extremely differently by the males and
females, causing a difference in ranking scores but not the
rating ones.
The difference in the sex did not invalidate our con¬
clusions to other parts of the present study as only females
are used in the 'IQ', 'Fakability 1 and 'Equivalence in
translation1 studies. Furthermore, there is no difference in
the results in the age-education group study when the male
and female scores are analyzed separately.
PaVphi1ifv
Correlated t-tests showed that the P and D scores were
not significantly different among the fake good, fake bad and
standard conditions (see Tables 12 and 13).
Assuming that moral judgment is developmental, the
subjects can easily distinguish the lower stage reasoning
but not chose above their own. Thus, for those statements
within their comprehension range, that is, stage 2 and 3
(and probably some stage 4) items, students will give greater
importance when fake bad and less importance when fake good.
Table 12
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Fakability: Means of D, M, Stage scores (rating,
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aS= standard G= good B= bad;
S-G: n= 19; G-S: n= 13; SB; n= 18; BS: n= 17; SS; n= 14
81'= not important '5'= very important
JB. 05
£ .01
Results in the correlated t-tests of ranking scores supported
the above hypothesis. Students did give less importance to
stage 2 reasoning in the fake good condition, t (18)= 2.34,
£.05; and more importance to stage 3 reasoning in the fake
bad condition, t (16)= 2,74, £.05. The ratings showed
similar results with a greater importance to stage 2, 3 and
4 reasoning when faked bad and less importance when faked
good (see Table 12).
As compared to the ranking score analysis, the rating
score method produced more significant differences in the
faking conditions. This is expected because in each story,
the rankings only tap the four most important statements
with no information on the rejection of the remaining eight
statements. However when students are asked to fake good
(or bad) the difference may just lie on the greater rejectior
(or acceptance) of low stage items. The importance of
analyzing the rejection of statements which cannot be accom-
panished by the ranking method, has been critically examined
with promising results (Carroll rest, 1981).
If students are aware of stages that they have passed
through as immature, they should be able to pick reasoning
lower than their own and hence be successful in faking bad
as in the result of the McGeorge (1975) study. However in
the present study, no significant difference in P and D
scores was observed. This was probably due to a basal level
effect. McGeorge had used teacher college students while the
subjects in the present study were at F.3 only, who were at
the bottom of the DIT scale. They were unlikely to be able
to fake low unless some stage one items had been included.
In accordance with the findings of Meehan et al. (1979)
and McGeorge (1975), correlated t-tests of the P and D scores
showed that subjects in the present study were unable to
fake good.
Unexpectedly, the students gave more importance to the
principled reasoning when faked bad, correlated t-values of
the principled stages (rating) were in the range .90 to
4.69, five of the six t-values were significant at .05 level.
A possible explanation is that according to the cognitive
developmental model, the students are not capable of compre¬
hending reasoning above their own (stage 5A, 5B, 6). To
them, these principled stage statements should be as meaning¬
less as the 'M1 items (built-in meaningless items). When
asked to fake bad, the students will just give greater
importance to reasoning they themselves regard as unimportant
whether because it is immature (e.g. stage 2) or uncompre-
hensible (e.g. stage 5A, 5B, 6, M). That is when the students
encounter uncomorehensible statements in a fake bad condition,
they will rate them important, thinking that bad people have
just the opposite reasoning. Therefore as shown in the
results, the reasoning at stage 5A, 5B and 6 were rated more
important in the fake bad condition. This is further
supported by a significantly greater importance given to the
M items in the fake bad treatment, t (16)- 3.29, ph01.
Stage Structure
Table 14 gives the intercorrelations of the six stage
scores (rating). As one moves away, either left or right,
from the diagonal element in any row, the values tend to
decrease. However reversals (i.e. violations) of the simplex
pattern were observed in .stages of the same moral level
(i.e. between stage 3 and 4, or between stage 5 and 6). The
eigen values and factor loadings are shown in Tables 15 and
16. Principal component factor analysis of the stage score
(rating) correlations produced two characteristic roots
greater than 1.00, which supported the prediction of two
factors. Along the first factor, intermediate stages tended
to have the highest loadings. Along the second factor,
variable loadings were ordered by stage, except for a minor
reversal between stage 3 and 4, and betveen stage 5B and 6.
As predicted (Davison, Robbins 5 Swanson, 1978), when the
points representing variable loadings are connected by a
smooth curve, a semicircle concave with respect to the
origin is produced (see Figure 2).
To see whether different cultures attribute the same
importance to the reasoning of the different stages, the
stage score profiles were compared. However due to the lack
of published detailed data of other cultures, a multivariate
profile analysis of the stage scores between different cultures
Table 1'
Stage Score (rating) Correlations
staq(












































was impossible. The best analyses possible were t-tests of
the means of stage scores (ranking) between the present group
and those in the U.S.A. with similar age-education level
(Rest, 1979a; Rest et ah, 1974) (see Figure 3). Results
showed that though there was no difference in the P score
between the middle and senior secondary school students in
two cultures, the Chinese middle secondary students, as
compared with those in the U.S.A. attributed more importance
to stage 3 reasoning and less to stage 4 reasoning; for stage
Noteworthily, the P score of the university students
in the U.S.A. were significantly higher than those of the
Chinese students, Myg= 54.9, MR]= 41.3, t (72)= 3.98,
£.01. T-tests of the stage score (ranking) showed that the
Table 15
Factor Analysis of Stage score Correlations




















Factor Loadings: Factor Analysis of Stage Scores





























T 1 o 17
Comparison of Staqe scores (rankinq): U.S.A. and H.K.
staae scores (rankina)
rid 1 i i— n A- 7 nr
9 o 4 5 6c 6
•y1-—
t rnrJ} mrq 4- i mean t mean t
14•; e
U.S.A. 11.6 20.5 35.2 32.7
H.K. 10.2 1.09 27.5 -3.6529.8 2.41 32.3 -.04
Sec
U.S.A. 9.6 22.3 30.7 37,4
H.K. 8.4 .93 24.4 -1.Q8 29.4 .54 37.9 -.18
Sen
Univ
U.S.A. 5.5 14.6 24.9 54.9
H.K. 8.2 -2. 27 21. 1 -3.0629.5 -1.83 41. 3 3. 98''
U• S. A• scores from Rest et al 0 (1978), H.K. scores from the present
s tudy
Id
the U.S.A. students in the mid sec group are indeed in junior high
school only while those in sen sec group are in senior high school
only.
Mid Sec: nTTOr= 40 nTT,r= 71Uun 11K
Sen Sec:= 40 nHK= 69
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Comparison of Stage Scores: HK U USA
(Middle Secondary)
STAGE
Chinese students attributed significantly more importance tc
the stage 2 and 3 reasoning, but less to the principled
reasoning, t (7 2)= 2.27, 3.06 and 3.98, p.05, .01, .01
respectively.
Gendron (1981) has measured the moral judgment develop¬
ment of several groups of Taiwan students using DIT. T-tests
of the P score showed that there was no significant difference
in moral judgment between the students (senior secondary and
university) in Taiwan and H0ng Kong; for senior secondary
students, t (108)- 1.97, n.s.; for university students,
t (68)= .00, n.s.
Another comparison showed that there was no difference
in P score of the middle secondary students in the present
research and those in Lai (1981) study (an intervention
study in Hong Kong), t (219)- .25, n.s.
Equivalence in Translation
The equivalence in translation can be analyzed either
at the item level or at the global performance level.
Correlated t-tests showed that there was no significant
difference in the D score between the two languages, whereas
the P score in the Chinese test was a bit higher than that
in the English test, t (31)= 2.08, p .04 (see Table 18).
As the P score reflected the reasoning at the principled
stages only, the discrepancy in the P and D score results
implied that differences between the two versions existed
at the principled stages only. A closer examination using
correlated t-tests to individual stage scores (ranking)
revealed that there was no significant difference in the
stage scores between the two languages in the first five
stages (2, 3, 4, 5A, 5B). However the students got a higher
stage 6 score (ranking) in the Chinese (M= 3.18) than in
the English This
is in agreement with Rest and Kohlberg's (1969) findings
that recaptulation and comprehension decline as the stage of
the statements become more advanced. A moral judgment is a
cognitive structure (Kohlberg, 1969; McGeorge, 1975; Rest,
1979a) and English is the second language of the students,
it is inevitable that the moral reasoning of students is
hampered through the use of a second language. Such hindrance
becomes more serious at advanced stages, such as stage 6.
Thus it is logical to argue that to the Chinese students the
P score (and D score) in the English version is an under
estimation whereas the scores in the Chinese version are the
subjects' actual level of moral judgment. Further support is
gained by comparing the subjects' P score with large group
means in the test manual (Rest, 1979b). There was no signi
ficant difference of P score between the senior high students
in the U.S.A. and that of the present group (F.6) when they
are both using test of their mother language. However the
P score of the students in U.S.A. was significantly higher
than those of the Chinese students when the later group was
using the English test (their second language), t (611)=
2.83, jd.005. That is, if we assume that there is no
difference in maturity of moral judgment between the present
group and those in the U.S.A. with the same educational level,
the Chinese DIT is a more accurate insturment for the Chinese
subjects, whereas the English DIT underestimates the Chinese
subj ects.
Pearson correlation of. P (and D) score between the
Chinese and English versions can be used as another measure
of equivalence. The correlation is indeed a reliability
between alternate-forms. Results showed that the correlation
of P and D scores between the two versions were all signifi¬
cant; for P, r (30)= .51, £.005; for D, r (30)= .38,
£. 05.
At the item level, equivalence between the two versions
was further supported by correlated t-tests which showed that
in 97% of the items (see Table 19), the ratings were not
significantly different between the two versions. Signifi¬
cant differences in the ratings between the two languages
were found only in items 19 and 25, t (31)= 3.04 and 3.39
respectively, £.01. The correlations of individual items
were relatively low, mean of 72 correlations equaled to .227.
However no comparison could be made because of the lack of
published or reported item correlation (test-retest) data.
Table 18
Means, Correlations and t-values of P, D, M and
Stage Scores between Chinese and English Versions
Mean
















































Reliability and Item Analysis
Two categories of scale reliability- estimate of
internal consistency and estimate of temporal stability of
DIT were measured. The standardized Cronbach 's alpha was
calculated by regarding each of the 6 stories as individual
items, alpha for P score was .50 (see Table 20). Alphas were
calculated for individual subscales as well. Higher values
were obtained for the subscales having more items, alphas
for stage 3, 4 and 5A were respectively .60, .60 and .56.
Table 19
Means, Correlations and t-values of Ratings on
Items between Chinese and English versions
Stage (Item number)
Me an
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values of this study, n= 242
original DIT, reported by Davison and Robbins (1978)
Stage 5B with the smallest number of items, 4 only, had the
lowest alpha value of .27.
The temporal stability was measured by the correlation
between the P, D and stage scores (ranking, rating) in the
two testings (see Table 21). However it was found that the
stability was only moderate, for P and D, r (56)= .32 and
.37 respectively. A most probable reason for this low
stability is due to the motivation effect, which can be
deterministic in any testing (Labov, 1970). The students
were having their examination at the second testing and were
quite unwilling to spend time on the retest. As a remedy,
another group of students, though quite small in number, were
retested and the results analyzed. It was found that the
reliability of P and D scores increased to .40 and .63
respectively. In the present reliability study, a homogenous
age group was used. If students of mixed moral judgment
level were used, the reliability would definitely increase.
Such an artificial increase in similar correlation coeffi¬
cients has been reported in other DIT studies (Froming 9
McColgan, 1981).
In order to eliminate items lying at the extremes of
the Likert scale (i.e. items always rated as very important
or unimportant), the means of item ratings were calculated
(see Table 22). The means of all items, except item 4, lay
between 1.40 and 4.60, a passing criterion suggested by Heir
and Gati (1981). Item 4 was rated extremely unimportant by
all students, which was not unexpected as it was one of the
five 'M' items (i.e. built-in meaninaless items).
To check whether the items have enough dispersion, the
standard deviations of ratings were calculated for each item.
Results showed that all standard deviations were greater than
.60, a passing criterion by Heir and Gati (1981).
The discrimination power of an item was assessed by
comparing the correlation between the item with the 6 stage
scores (ranking). A good item should have the highest
correlation with its own stage score and a low correlation
with scores of other stages. Results showed that in 61 out
of 72 items, the correlations with its own stage score were
the highest. For the remaining 11 wrongly keyed items, 9
items did not have significant correlation with any of the
6 stages, thus precluding them from being reassigned to
other staaes.
To eliminate items calusing internal inconsistency, the
corrected alphas were calculated by deleting each time an
item in the subscales. In only six of the 72 items, an
increase in alpha value resulted after the deletion. Since
the stage scores are factorial complex, all alphas calculated
are lower bound to, not. an estimate of, reliability defined

























































n= 58 for group 1
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11'= not important 4 5'= very important
value of corrected alpha greater than standardized alpha
_p .05
p .01
Chapter Five Conclusion and Discussion
Age-education
The present cross-sectional study showed an increase of
moral maturity in the more advanced age-education groups.
The difference in maturity was the greatest between the middle
secondary and the senior secondary students. An analysis of
moral judgment at the.stage score level showed that the more
advanced groups tended to attribute more importance to
principled moral consideration and less importance to stage 2
reasoning. A developmental model of moral judgment is supported.
Nevertheless, cross-sectional data can never substitute
a longitudinal study. A lot of the secondary students will
not be going to university, and therefore it would be
problematic to assume that the university scores are exactly
what the secondary school scores will be in several years
(Rest, 1979a, p.107). The age-education groups are used in
the present study more according to the criterion group
strategy. A three to four year longitudinal study in the
Chinese subjects as those done by Rest et al. (1978), would
show a clearer picture of the stage movement, thus separating
the cohort effects from ontological change (Rest, 1979a,
p.113).
In this study, no attempt has been made to disentangle
the effect of age and education. An advancement in education
level is often associated with an older age, and hence
controlling the age effect in ANCOVA will have a much simila
effect as partialling out the effect of education as well.
However it is still possible to compare the strength of the
two effects by using random adult samples (Coder, 197 5;
Dortzbach, 1975; G. Rest, 1977) or subjects in a longitudina
study who go or not go to colleges (Rest, 1975). Results
suggest that moral judgment is more positively related to
education than to chronological age.
I(
According to the cognitive developmental model, moral
judgment is one, but distinct, aspect of general intellectua
developmental, so it is expected that moral judgment should
have a moderate but positive correlation with IQ. The
correlation coefficient .24 in the present study is in the
range of most studies in other cultures: .20, .35 (Davison
Robbins, 1978), .42, .45, .06, .39 (Holstein, 1976), .50
(Krebs 6c Gillmore, 1982), .41 (Martin et al., 1977), .53
(Lai 6: Cheng, 1982).
Sex
Is there any sexual difference in moral judgment? Is it
due to an actual difference in mode of reasoning or just
because of instrumental bias. Researchers (Holestein, 1976;
Gilligan, 1977; Rest, 1979a, p.120) still cannot come to a
definite agreement.
The sex effect in the present study was not conclusive.
Females were higher than males in the P score but no
difference was detected in the D score. Results of detailed
analyses of the ranking and rating stage scores suggested
that some items were ranked extremely differently by the males
and females. It is also interesting to note that in Rest et
al. (1974), Schomberg (1978) (the only two D1T studies
reported to have significant sex effect, see Rest (1979a))
and the present study, it is always females who are more
advanced in moral judgment. Coincidently the sex effect in
all these studies account for about 6% of the variance.
Similarly, in Lew's (1983) study with Chinese teachers, males
showed a weaker superego as compared with females.
On the contrary, Haan et al s (1968) and Holesteins (1976]
studies all tended to show that females were related with
stage 3 reasoning while males were related with stage 4
reasoning. Holestein explained that stage 3 reasoning
stressed compassion, sympathy or love as a reason for moral
action, which was stereotypicallv part of the female role.
Thus she argued that Kohlberg's stages were sexist becuase
they emphasized the cognitive aspect of moral judgment and not
the sentiments of compassion, sympathy and love. However
she did not show how the stereotypical compassionate female
thinking at stage 3 provided a better rationale for solving
complex social and moral problems at stage 4, 5 or 6 (Rest,
1979a, p.124). Thus difference in sex still remains a problem
to be explored.
F akabilitv
The results of the fakability study do support the
hypothesis that students are unable to fake good. One
explanation as suggested by McGeorge (1975) is that in a
sequence of cognitive development, to the subjects, the
stages they have passed through are immature, but stages
higher than their own are inaccessible. Thus faking upwards
is precluded. Another explanation by Meehan et al. (1979)
and Hogan (1981) is that subjects may be already presenting
a favorable impression of themselves under the standard
condition, so making no difference in the fake good condition.
In the fakability studyf the analyses of lower stages
(stage 2, 3, 4) and rating scores produces more meaningful
and significant differences than that by using the principled
stages (stage 5 and 6) and rankings. An explanation is that
the P and stage score (ranking) analyses are based on the
»
4 most important ranks out of the 12 items. Information on
the rejection or acceptance of the remaining issues are
totally ignored in the calculation. As Davison and Robbins
(1978) have criticized: P is insensitive to changes occuring
in lower stages, which is particularly important in the
evaluation of outcomes of clinical and educational programs.
The rejection of lower stages is also brought into scrutiny.
Carroll and Rest (1981) found that the rejection scores of
the lower stages (stage 1 and 2) had the highest internal
consistency. Thus it is strongly recommended that the
analysis of stage scores (rating) be reported as well
especially in short term intervention studies where subjects
are discarding lower stage thinking only and not yet gaininc
any advanced reasoning.
Stage Structure
The factor analysis of stage score (rating) correlations
generates two factors with Eigen values 2.67 and 1.15
accounting for 64% of the variance which is comparable with
Davison, Robbins and Swanson's results: Eigen values equal
2.80 and 1.50 accounting for 12% of variance. From the factor
loadings, the largest interval occur between stage 2 and
stage 34 which corresponds to the transition from pre-
conventional to conventional thinking in Kohlberg's (1969)
theory. Tpe second largest interval occurs between
stage 34 and 5 which corresponds to the transition.from
conventional to principled thinking. Kohlberg's major
distinctions between preconventional, conventional and
principled levels are reproduced in the present Chinese sample.
Despite the similairty in general trends of moral
development, reversals within the same moral levels (i.e.
between stage 3 and 4, or between stage 5 and 6) are observed.
This is not surprising as the scale values in a multidimen¬
sional scaling analysis (Davison, Robbins Swanson, 1978;
Schonemann, 1970) also show reversals among stage 5A, 5B and
6. Furthermore factor analysis (Cooper, 1972) indicates
that stage 5A, 5B and 6 cluster together and can be treated
simply as a single set of issues.
Due to the lack of published detailed data of other
cultures, very limited stage profile comparisons can be made.
Except at the university level, there is no difference in
moral maturity between the students in Hong Kong and U.S.A.
However the Chinese gives more importance to stage 3 reasoning
which is heavily based on compassion, sympathy or love as
reasons for moral action. This is congruent with-Lei and
Cheng's (1982) findings that the Chinese moral judgments are
characterized by the traditional concept of filial piety in
particular and affiliation in general.
At the university level, the Chinese students are
morally less mature than those in the U.S.A. Similar findings
are also observed in some other cross-cultural DIT studies
(Chen, 1977; Gendron, 1981). At the present stage, it is
impossible to determine whether the difference is a reflec
tion of a true cultural difference in content and structure,
or just an artifact of instrumental defects. More fruitful
cultural comparison can be made when sufficient knowledge
is accumulated from works which investigate moral judgment
at a finer level (Grueneich, 1982); for instance: how the
story content affects the judgment (Hales, 1981; Jensen
Hughston, 1973; McGeorge, 1974; Moran, 1980), how the items
are perceived, what association comes to mind and so on
(Rest, 1979a, p.257).
Equivalence in Translation
Analyses of the items, P, D and stage scores show that
the Chinese version is a good translation of the original
English version within tolerable errors.
In the translation process, some concepts in the source
language may not have equivalence in the target language.
Extra care has to be taken for concepts that are culturally
biased, like social distance, which require a different scale
under different cultures. Thus a detailed verification of
equivalence in translation demands a much broader scope of
study of the target test in the area of construct validity,
divergent convergent properties with other instruments, etc.
For the DIT, it is especially difficult to translate 'meaning¬
less 1 items which aim at trapping subjects who choose items
based on high-sounding verbiage. The result shows that there
is no significant difference in the M score between the two
languages. This means that these items are equally meaningless
in both versions.
In this study, it is assumed that the subjects can master
Chinese and English equally well, which is an unattainable
ideal. It is expected that when a group of students of better
standard of Chinese and English is employed for the study, a
higher correlation and a smaller discrepancy in the P, S and
ratings between the two versions will be obtained.
Reliability and Item Analysis
Results of item analyses show that the item ratings are
lying within the acceptable range and have sufficient disper¬
sion of variance. Though the discrimination test shows that
9 to 11 items in the Chinese DIT have to be rewritten or
keyed again, the test is still satisfactory as compared with
the original DIT in which 6 items are rejected as recommended
by Martin et al. (1977).•'
The internal consistency as measured by Cronbach~'s alpha
shows that the Chinese test is not any worse than the original
English version. However the result of the temporal stability
is not promising, which is due primarily to the low motivation
in taking the test twice.
Finale
All in all, the Chinese DIT is satisfactory in terms of
reliability coefficients and item characteristics as compared
with the original English version. Moreover, the results of
the age-education, IQ, sex, fakability and stage structure
studies are generally in accord with results in other cultures.
Researchers have distinguished two types of cross-
cultural research: the emic and etic approaches (Dawson
Lonner, 197 4, pp.27- 37; Lonner, 197 9, p. 17; Werner Campbell,
1970). The emic approach tries to describe phenomena in a
culture by utilizing concepts employed in that culture while
the etic approach studies a phenomenon by using universal
concepts. Many current cross-cultural psychological research,
including the present study, utilize a pseudo-etic approach,
that is, a test made in one culture, an emic measure from
the U.S.A., is used in studies in another culture as if it
were an etic instrument. A very important task is to
describe the independent variable and dimensionalize the
environment. Thus we have to stop describing the sample simply
as Hong Kong Chinese students, but rather talk about variables
such as family organization, economic development, cultural
traditions, etc. When we are using a selected group and not
a random sample of the whole culture, we are indeed studying
an accidental intersection of a large number of variables
which is like a study of a two to the nth factorial design.
Therefore many of the two-culture studies should be viewed as
a comparison of two cells each from a 2 design.
It is beyond the scope of the present study to describe
fully the characteristics of Chinese, or Chinese students in
Hong Kong to be more precise. However if we can still find
a generality and on top of that phenomenon exists within
culture, with a very different set of methods, then we are
in a very good position to argue that we have established
the generality of the phenomenon (Triandis, 1974, p.30).
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ADDendix A
Kohlberq's Six Stages of Moral Development
Preconventional Level
Stage 1: The Heteronomous Stage
a) What is right? Right is blind obedience to rules and
authority, avoiding punishment, and not doing physical
harm. Thus, what is right is to avoid breaking rules
backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and
avoiding physical damage to persons and property.
b) Reasons for upholding right: The reasons for doing right
are avoidance of punishment and the superior power of
authorities.
c) Social perspective: Egocentric point of view. Does not
consider the interests of others or recognize they differ
from one's own. Does not relate two points of view.
Actions are considered in terms of physical consequences
rather than in terms of psychological interests of others.
Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.
Stage 2: The Stage of -Individualism and Instrumental Purpose
and Exchange
a) What is right? Right is serving one 's own or other 's needs
and making fair deals in terras of concrete exchange. Hence
one follows rules when it is to one 's immediate interest tc
do so. Right is acting to'meet one 's own interest and
needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what
is fair, that is, what is an equal exchange, a deal, an
agreement.
k) Reasons for upholding right: The reason for doing right is
to slerve one s own needs or interests in a world where you
have to recognize that other people have their interests,
too.
c) Social perspective: Concrete individualistic perspective.
Separates own interests and points of view from those of
authorities and others. There is an awareness that every¬
body has their own interests to pursue, and that these
interests often conflict, so that right is ire 1 ca tive
(in the concrete individualistic sense). Integrates or
relates conflicting individual interests to one another
through instrumental exchange of services, through the
instrumental need for the other and the other's good will,




Stage 3: The Stage of Mutual Interpersonal Expectations
Rp] Rf i nn.qhin.q. and Interoersnnal Conformitv
a) What is right? Right is playing a good (nice) role, being
concerned about other people and their feelings, keeping
loyalty and trust with partners, and being motivated to
follow rules and expectations. Hence right is living up
to what is expected by peole close to you or what people
generally expect-of people in your role as son, sister,
friend, etc. Being good is important and means having
good motives, the showing of concern about others. It
also means keeping mutual relationships, maintaining trust
lovaltv, respect, and gratitude.
b) Reasons for upholding right? Reasons include 1) the nee
to be seen as ngood in one 's own eyes and the eyes of
others, 2) concern for others, and 3) recognition that i
you put yourself in the other person 's place you would
want good behavior from the self (Golden Rule).
c) Social perspective: Perspective of the individual in
relationship to other individuals. There is an awareness
of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which
take primacy over individual interests. Relates point
of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting oneself
in the other person's shoes. Does not generalized system1
perspective.
Stage 4: The Social System and Conscience Stage
a) What is right? Right is doing one 's duty in society,
upholding the social order; and the welfare of society
or the group. Hence one is obliged to fulfil the actual
duties to which one has agreed. Laws are to be upheld
excext in extreme cases vhere they conflict with other
fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society,
the group, or institution.
b) Reasons for upholding right: The reasons for doing right
are to keep the institution going as a whole (what if
everyone did it?), or self-respect or conscience seen as
meeting one's defined obligations.
c) Social perspective: Differentiates societal point of view
from interpersonal agreement or motives. Takes the point
of view of the system which defines roles and rules.
Considers individual relations in terms of place in the
system.
ADDendix A (Cont.)
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Stage 45: The Transitional Stage that is Pqstconventional but
not yet Principled
What is right? There is an awareness of relativity of
different social standards, so that the orientation is
to personal moral values or conscience. Conscience,
however, is the internalized social standards of Stage
4. One has a duty to follow one's conscience. There may
be an objective external moral law expressing the essence
of social morality.
b) Reasons for upholding right: Moral choice is personal
and subjective. It is. based on emotions and hedonism
rather than conscience, since conscience is seen as
arbitrary and relative, as are terms like duty, morally
right, etS. Hence one's moral decisions are personal and
subjective, unless they impinge on rights of others.
Morality is arbitrary and relative because one has the
right to free choice. Rights, however, are bounded by the
like rights of others.
c) Social perspective: Subjective and outside of society.
The perspective is that of an individual standing outside
of his own society and considering himself as an individual
making decisions without a generalized commitment or
contract with society. One can pick and choose obligations
which are defined by particular societies, but one has no
principles for such choice.
Stage 5: The Stage of Social-Contract or Utility and of
Individual Rights
a) What is right? Right is upholding the basic rights, values
and legal contracts of a society, even when they conflict,
with the concrete rules and laws of that society. Hence
there is an awareness that people hold a variety of values
and opinions and that most values and rules are relative
to a specific group. Because they constitute the social
contract, these relative rules should usually be upheld.
However, some non-relative values and rights like 1ife and
1iberty must be upheld in any society regardless of
majority opinion or specific laws if those values are
endangered.
b) Reasons for upholding right: Reasons are, in general, that
Stage 5 reasoners feel obligated to obey the law because
they have made a social contract to make and abide by laws
for the good of all and to protect their own rights and the
rights of others. There is the feeling that family, friend¬
ship, trust, and work obligations are also commitments or
Appendix A (Cont.)
contracts they have freely entered into and entail respect
for the rights of others„ They are concerned that lavs
and duties be based on rational calculation of overall
utility, the greatest good for the greatest number.
c) Social perspective: Prior to society perspective. The
perspective of a rational individual aware of values and
rights prior to actual social attachments and contracts.
Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement,
contract, objective impartiality and due process. Considers
moral point of view, legal point of view, recognizes
they conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.
Staqe 6: The Staqe of Universal Ethical Princples
a) What is right? Stage 6-' is guided by -universal, self-chosen
ethical principles which all humanity should follow.
Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid
because they rest on such principles. When laws violate
these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle.
Principles are universal principles of justice: e.g., the
equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of
human beings as individual persons. These are not merely




Reasons for upholding right: As a rational person, the
stage 6 reasoner has seen the validity of principles and
has become commited to them.
Social perspective: Perspective of a moral point of
view from which social arrangements derive or on which
they are grounded. The perspective is that of any rational
individual recognizing the nature of morality or the basic
moral premise of respect for other persons as ends, not
means.
Note. F r orn' 'Measurement of Moral Judgment: a manual and
its results by Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., Candee, D.
Speicher-Dubin, B., Kauffman, K., Hewer, R., and Power, C.
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Table 2.
Appendix£
This questionnaire ie airaed at understanding hcrw people think about social
probleca. Different people often have different opinions about questions of right
and wrong. There are no right answers in the way that there are right answers to
nath problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about several problem
stories. The papers will be fed to a computer to find the average for the whole group
and no one will see vour individual answers.







Ln this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about severa.
stories. Here is a story as an example.
Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two snal
children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only oa
It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for va¬
cation trips also. In trying to decide-what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that
there were a lot of questions to consider. Below there is a list of seme of these
questions.
If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in decid¬
ing what car to buy?
Tn ct Tur~r nn; fnr P 7 r— A?( e Oue.sr.io.
On the left hand side check one of the spaces by each statement of a consideration.
(For instance, if you think that statement 1 is not important in making a decision
about buying a car, check the space on the right.)
Tvrrii?Tn»jT.
Great Much Some Little No
1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as
where Frank lives. (Note that in this sample,
the person taking the questionnaire did net thirl
2. Would a used car be sore economical in the long
rain than a new car. (Note that a check was put i;
the far left space to indicate the opinion that
this is an important issue in making a decision
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least
200. (Note that if you are unsure about what
cubic inch displacement means, then mark it nomm.i. C•
5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact
WA,
6. Whetner the front connibilies were differential,
(Note that if a statement sounds like gibberish or
...— i.: w
Instmotions for Part 3: (Sancle Question)
From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group.
Put the number of the cost important question on the top line belcv. to likewise for
your 2nd, 3rd and 4th most important choices. (Note that the top choices in this case
will come from the statements that were checked on the far left-hand side—statements
2 and were thought to be very important. In deciding what is the most important,
a person wouid re-read 2 and 5, and then pick one cf them as the mo st important, then
out the other one as second most important, and so on.)
MOST
5— 3
Note. From Revised manual for the Defining Issues Test
by Rest, J R- Minneapolis: Minnesota Moral Research Projects
1979. (James Rest, 1972. All Rights Reserved.)
HEINZ AND THE DRDC
Ln Europe a woman was near death from a special ki-nd of cancer. There war one
drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form, of radium that a druggist
in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the
druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the
radium and charged $2000 for a small dose cf the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz,
went to everyone he knew to borrow the coney, but he could only get together about
$1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying,
and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, No, I
discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it. So Heinz got desperate and
began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.
Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one)
Should steal it Can't decide Should not steal it
IMPORTANCE:
C y» t- Ckhfr-ra T i 1 a Vrh
1 Wht h r A rri mrmi n i f-v 1 c 1 a w c n r nr rn r K o irnh» 1
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care
so much for his wife that he'd steal?
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar
or going to jail for the chance that stealing the
i- r-Mr rh t- K 1 r- 5
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this
solelv to helD someone else.
6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have
7. Whether the essence of living is more enconpassmg
than the termination of dying socially and indi-
VI 1 1 7
8. What values are going to be the basis for governing
h nu r n 1 a c— nw a e» a r h
3, Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide
behind a worthless law which only protects the rich
31Xt V.-ft
10. Whether the l.v jn this case is gettmc in the wavA JZ L. A M.» 1 A£ M A rn Mn. rM L.« AS«• AA 1 A1•« f
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be rccbea for being
a A 1 A% 1 i
12. Would stealing m such a case bring about tore total
•Tr-o -s ~r y£» mo 1 m eor i afv n r nnf






At Harvard -University a group of students, called the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS), believe that the University should not have an arty RCTC program. SDS
students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the artny training program helps send
men to fight in Viet Nan. The SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army P£TC
training program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could
not get amy training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for it
t !~n~r» T r i r rxTT« c
Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the RCTC pro¬
gram as a university course. But the President of the University stated that he
wanted to keep the amy program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt that the
President was not going tc pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands.
So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the university 1 s
administration building, and told everone else to get out. They sard they were doing
this to force Harvard to get rid of the amy training program as a course.
Should the students have taken over the administration building? (Cneck one)
Yes, they should take it over Can't decide No, they shouldn't take it over
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Some Little No
1. Are the students doing this to really help other
3pnclf or srr- rhpv rni -ic•- r.s r £nr V r V e
2. Do the students have any right to rake over prop-
ertv that doesn't belona to them?
3. Do the students realize than they might be arrested
and fined, and even excelled from school?
4. Would taking over the building in the long run
benefit more oeoDle to a creater extent?
5. Whether the president stayed within the limits of
his authoritv in icmcrir.c the facultv vote.
6. Will the taxeover anger tne pumiic and give ail
students a bad name?
7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles
of -iustice?
3. Would allowing cr.e student take-ovar encourage many
other student take-overs?
9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on
himself bv beir.c so unreasonable and unccooerative?
10. Whether running tne 'university ought to be in the
hands of a few administrators or in the hands of
all the oeocle.
11. Are the students following principles which they
believe are above the law?
12. Whether or not university decisions ougnt to be
rescected bv students.
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:




A can had beer, sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he
escaped from prison, moved to a now area of the country, and took on the name of
Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy
his ovn business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and
gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor,
recognized him as the car, who had escaped from prison 8 years before, and whom the
police had been looking for.
Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison?
(Chock ona)
Should report him _a__i ji
IMPORTANCE
a» M 1 W C 1 a V
1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such t
lop.q zzme uo Drove ne isn c a Dac oersoni...—. i~ i- I.----—..... I.,. .I,., i n i i....
2. Evertine someone escapes punishment for a crime
doesn t that ?ust encourage more crime?
3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the
ocDression or our leoai systems.'
4. Has Mr. Thompson really said his cent to society
5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should
fairlv expect?
6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society
especially for charitable man?
7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to
send Mr. Thompson to orison?
-Hill in! mill-- i n i t.,, n m-, i r. i i i n,i i
8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who had to
serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was
let off?
9. Was Mrs. Jones a cood friend of Mr. Thomson?ii i... HI n i i- i i i ii
10. 'Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped
criminal, recardless of the circurstances?
11. How would the will of the people and trie puniic good
best be served?
12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson





A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured ar.d she had only about
six no nebs to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good
dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious
and almost crarv with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to
give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and
that she was going to die in a few months anyway.
What should the doctor do? (Check one)
He should give the lady an
overdose that will make her die
Can't decide Should not give
the overdo3e
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Soma Little No
1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of giving
Kor V mrr a r r r c r or- rhit
2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as
everybody else if giving her am overdose would
hp thp qarop ki I 1 ino her.
3. Whether people would be much better off without
society regimenting their lives and even their
c
4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an
j»r r 1
5. Does the state have the right to force continued
existence on those who don't want to live.
6. What is the value of death prior to society's
r« A V«• T» a W» T ua 1 na«
7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's
suffering or cares more about what society might
-V i ok-
8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible
arr_ nf monrafinn.
9. Whether only Goc snould decide wnen a person's
life should end.
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his
own oersonal code of behavior.
11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives
uhn wAnr tn.
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and
still protect the live3 of individuals who want to
1





Mx. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire
another mechanic to help him, but good machanics were hard to find. The only
person he food -who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mx. Lee, but he was Chinese.
While Mr. Webster hioself didn't have anything against Orientals, he was afraid
to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like Orientals. His custome
might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station.
When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said th
he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody
becauso he could not find anybady whowas a good nechanic besides Mr Lee.
What should MR. Webste have done? (Check one)
IMP ORTANCE
Great Much Some Little NO
1. Does the owner of a business have the right t
make his own business decisions or not?
2. Whether there is a law that forbide racial dis
crimination in hirina for iocs.3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against
orientals himself or whether he means nathin
personal in refusing the job.
4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attentic
to his customers'wishes would be best for his
5 What individual differences ouqht co be relevau
in deciding how society's roles are filled?
6. Whether the greedy and competicive capicalistic
svstera ought to be completely abandoned.
7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster's society
feel like his customers or are a majority against
preiudice?
8. rhether himc cacahle ten lihe Mr. Lee vculd use
talents that would otherwise be lost to society.
9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent
I with Mr. Webster's own coral beliefs?
10. Could Mr. Webster be sc hard-hearted as to refuse
the job, knowing ho much it iteaits to Mr. Lee?
11. Whether the Christian ccmr-anciitent to love your
renew nvin aooiies in tnis case.
12.If someone'sin need,shouldn'thebehelpedresardless of what vou cet Sack from him?





Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper
for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He -anted to speak
out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out against some of the school's
rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wean long hair.
When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission.
The principal said it would be all right if before ever publication Fred would
turn in all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned m
several articles for approval. The principal approved all of then and Fred
polished two issues of the yper in the mexe two weexs
But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so
nruch attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize
protests against the haur regulation and other school rules. Ar.gr parents
ob}«ctad to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the news¬
paper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising
excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He cave as a reason
that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.
Should the orincioal stop the newspaper? (Check one)
Should stop ii Can't decide Should not stop it
IMPORTANCE:
Great Much Some Little No 1. Is the principal core responsible to students
2 Did the principal give his word that the news¬
paper could be published for a long tine, or die
he just promise to approve the newspaper one
3. Would the students start protesting even more if
4. When the welfare cf the school is threatened, dees
the orincital have the richt to crive orders to
5. Does the principal have tne freedom cf speech to
6. If the principal stopped the newspaper would he he
7. 'Whether the principal1 s order would rake Fred lose
8. Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and
9, What effect would stopping the paper have on the
student1s education in critical thinking anc
10. Whether Fred was m any way violating the rights of
11. Whetner tha principal should be influenced by some
angry parents when it is the principal that knows
12. Whocher Fred was tsir.g the newspaper to stir up











請 您 對 問 卷 的 幾 腦 故 事 ， 位 出 您 的 总 兄 。
I
下 而 的 故 汫 是 一 丨 迎 例 子 ， 供 您 參 巧 。
1110VI 111 11
的唯一 III[1|1:
盗 麽 找 的 屯 防 ， 冇 识 多 問 ⑵ 要 巧 虚 。 下 面 尕 一 些 他 要 疗 店 ： 的 問 蹈 。
假 如 你 是 純 先 生 ， 在 艿 虛 購 贸 那 一 秘 汽 班 時 ， 下 列 各 問 頌 的 屯 要 性 如 何 ？









钉 料 在 做 決 定 時 ， 並 不 屯 要 】 。
411|15




⑤ 大 而 灯 敞 的 汽 也 否 比 小 的 更 好 。
⑧ 前 缸 力 土 足 否 分 辨 式 。 （ 如 災 您 感 到 川 子 立 及 不 明 ， 玷 彳 不 屯
妥 那 方 格 。





项 口 识 二 冚 。 】 例 如 ：
奶 一 屯 要 ：









歐 洲 冇 一 ⑷ 人 见 了 癌 症 ， 生 命 识 位 险 。 较 生 們 知 沿 只 一 钝 藥 或 許 可 救 回 她 的 性 命 〔
V






4 1 ③ 不 幽 說 尖 伯









① 他 的 做 法 是 否 符 合 社 窗 的 法 邙
② 一 腿 愛 炎 子 的 丈 夫 ， 關 懷 泌 子 而 去 偸 不 足 一 件 汩 冃 然 的 讲 吡 ？
2
④ 先 生 珐 否 職 業 摔 角 手 ， 成 若 他 能 否 釤 响 其 他 摔 角 手
⑤ 釔 先 生 是 否 岱 自 己 而 偸 ， 或 紙 贿 助 他 人 而 偸






那 盼 藥 師 旣 饤 心 又 歿 忍 ， 被 劫 是 否 邡 冇 腔 “ 。
’1( 0
马 從 上 列 問 迎 ， 選 出 公 茁 耍 的 四 题 ， 塡 在 答 宽 紙 。
笫 一 迅 ： 耍
沿 三 冚 迎 弟 四 屯 处醫一翁
学 校 占 据 大 学
‘尖國茗名哈佛大极)― V




裝 在 校 內 保 份 這 課 没 , 認 口 校 畏 + 伶 迎 尙 他 們 和 敎 授 的 決 誌 及 装 求 。
因 此 在 去 年 四 月 苋 日 ， 二 百 個 ！ ) 的 昂 生 ， 走 進 大 ， 行 政 大 阳 ， 巧 令 所 冇 人 離 去 。
他 們 說 此 堺 迆 迪 使 校 方 打 辦 此 讥 取 訓 純 課 松 。
二 學 生 腿 否 佔 拟 大 ， 行 政 大 阽 ？ （ 站 在 答 宽 紙 ； 一 项 ）
① 應 該 佔 丈 ② 不 能 決 定 ： ③ 不 应 该 占 据
重 要 性 （ 请 在 答 案 纸 作 答 ）
要 要 要 要 要
重 重 重 重 重
常
非 很 尚 不 不
0
② 冷 生 否 冇 拙 佔 捉 不 磁 於 他 們 的 让 築 物 呢 ？
()']51
④ 仏 迠 染 沿 ， 學 生 佔 拟 校 舍 是 否 令 页 多 人 冇 絞 大 得 益 ？
⑤ 校 長 是 否 有 權 不 迎 舍 敎 授 的 投 票 結 见 。
③ 佔 拡 校 舍 逄 否 尙 令 公 衆 愤 怒 ， 從 而 扪 害 所 冇 摩 生 龄 界 。
⑦ 佔 據 校 舍 足 否 合 乎 正 礙 的 盼 则 ？
⑧ 矜 許 艾 一 生 佔 抄 校 金 柯 否 鼓 秘 贝 多 其 他 學 生 作 出 佔 據 的 行 口 ？
⑨ 校 引 來 這 誤 色 是 否 甶 於 他 的 不 合 迎 扣 不 合 作 呢 ？
1]
VI
生 尕 也 應 该 乜 瓜 大 冷 的 決 定 。
琴 從 上 列 問 頌 口 出 设 茁 驳 的 四 题 ， 頌 在 答 麥 紙 。
第 一 重 要 第 二 重 要
第 三 重 要 第 四 重 要
逃 犯
3!.



















〉 譚 信 多 年 來 行 爲 及 好 ， 不 是 已 經 證 明 他 並 非 墟 人 啦 ？
訂 人 犯 邡 後 能 逃 避 懲 別 ， 豈 不 圮 鼓 拗 贝 多 人 犯 卵 ？
；如果沒冇監獄和秘迫人的法你制度，找們不是過 VI
〉 譚 信 适 否 已 經 愤 還 了 他 對 社 鈐 的 粘 欠 ？
〉 社 會 是 否 無 法 達 到 譚 信 合 迚 的 期 望 ？ ,
： ) 尤 其 是 對 一 個 行 善 的 人 而 言 ， 監 獄 脫 離 了 社 曾 ， 有 何 好 宓 ？
II
0
〕 鈍 太 太 是 否 譚 ( ！ 的 好 朋 友 ？
》 無 論 淸 況 如 问 ， 難 逍 舉 報 逃 犯 不 琏 公 民 應 布 的 货 任 嗎 ？
！ ) 怎 找 设 能 滿 足 大 衆 的 总 願 和 公 共 的 利 益 ？
》 送 力 口 入 監 獄 ， 足 否 對 仙 太 分 冇 好 處 ， 成 若 對 他 人 冇 保 隙 ？
马 從 上 列 問 题 ， 選 出 敁 屯 耍 的 四 项 ， 塡 在 答 案 紙 。




醫 生 的 矛 屑
0’
即 使 茁 一 點 的 土 疝 藥 ， 如 幌 啡 之 類 ， 也 色 加 速 她 的 死 亡 。 痛 苦 令 她 牯 神 狂 亂 。 柯 记 她 沽 醒
平 靜 時 ， 她 要 求 發 生 阳 足 夠 的 鹋 啡 去 結 朿 她 的 生 命 ， 闪 口 她 打 在 無 法 忍 受 痛 苦 ， 況 且 她 在
:6
二 粒 生 應 、 該 怎 様 做 ？ 〔 誚 在 答 黎 紙 — 项 】
① 給 她 過 位 的 藥 物 結 束 她 的 生 命 ―
不 妬 卟 帘 ③ 不 腮 於 她 渦 的 唤 物
① 該 女 仕 的 家 人 是 否 赞 成 給 她 過 位 的 藥 ？
② 醫 生 與 其 他 人 是 否 受 闷 找 法 找 的 約 朿 ， 給 過 的 藥 物 就 等 於 殺 死 她 。
0
④ 醫 生 能 否 令 這 件 堪 看 來 好 像 出 於 辽 外 ？
⑤ 對 那 些 不 願 生 存 的 人 ， 國 家 是 否 有 權 強 泊 他 們 繼 給 生 存 ？
0111
⑦ 究 竞 那 醫 生 同 淸 該 病 人 的 痛 苦 ， 遝 足 他 页 關 心 社 鈐 的 沿 法 。
⑧ 鉍 助 他 人 結 朿 生 命 ， 是 否 可 兑 一 桢 负 以 任 的 合 作 行 口 ？
⑨ 是 否 只 布 上 天 才 冇 權 決 定 人 的 生 命 何 時 結 束 ？
⑩ 那 醫 生 是 以 甚 麽 似 値 標 準 ' 作 爲 目 己 行 口 的 守 則 ？
0
社 色 能 否 容 許 冃 殺 和 人 范 毁 滅 ， 同 時 亦 保 陣 祚 坌 生 存 者 的 生 命 。
—-'Ct±.n lit]'$ Hi fti IE 92 ffl a' F;
笫 一 逭 要
沿 三 爪 要
笫二 12





牮 先 生 是 一 間 車 房 的 老 闆 詖 經 理 ， 他 想 偏 阳 一 位 技 工 協 助 他 ， 但 好 的 技 工 不 易 找 ， 他
唯 一 找 到 的 人 是 里 先 生 。 看 來 里 先 生 是 一 個 好 技 工 ， 可 惜 他 是 印 度 人 ， 雖 然 韋 先 生 對 印 度
人 沒 冇 偏 見 ， 叼 是 他 不 敢 錄 用 里 先 生 ， 因 爲 他 的 顧 客 汨 多 都 不 客 歆 印 度 人 ， 如 果 里 先 生 在
510
0
人 ， 因 爲 除 了 里 先 生 以 外 ， 他 找 不 到 一 位 好 的 技 工 。
， 盘 先 生 聰 該 怎 機 做 ？
3 》 偏 兩 里 先 生 (2 不 账 诀 定











〉 老 閲 是 否 有 權 作 目 己 生 意 上 的 決 定 ？
〉 法 律 是 否 管 制 聘 請 僱 員 時 ， 不 得 存 有 種 族 歧 視 。
〕 究 竟 韋 先 生 是 否 對 印 度 人 有 偏 見 ， 抑 或 雖 然 他 不 僱 闬 里 先 生 ， 却 並 非
表 示 個 人 的 偏 見 ？
〉 聘 請 一 個 良 好 的 技 工 或 遷 就 客 人 的 意 願 ， 那 一 樣 對 生 意 更 有 幫 助 ？
〉 當 決 定 如 何 塡 補 社 會 中 角 色 時 ， 那 樣 涸 人 的 差 異 應 當 放 在 考 慮 之 列 ？
！ ) 貪 得 無 厭 和 充 滿 競 爭 的 資 本 主 義 制 度 是 否 應 該 完 全 廢 除 ？
： ) 是 否 社 會 大 多 數 的 人 與 章 先 生 的 顧 客 都 有 相 同 感 覺 ， 還 是 大 部 份 人 都
反 對 這 偏 見 。
〕 僱 闬 像 里 先 生 這 樣 的 人 ， 是 否 可 以 充 份 運 用 他 的 才 能 ， 使 社 會 不 致 受
損 失 。
〉 不 僱 用 里 先 生 是 否 與 韋 先 生 目 己 的 遒 德 信 念 相 符 合 ？
！ ) 韋 先 生 知 造 這 份 工 作 對 里 先 生 很 重 要 ， 他 能 硬 著 心 腸 不 偏 闬 他 嗎 ？
！ ) 基 督 敎 愛 人 如 己 的 试 條 ， 在 此 適 用 嗎 ？
0
乓 從 卜 列 問 颖 ， 潠 出 最 菹 要 的 四 题 ， 塡 在 答 案 紙 。
第 一 蜇 耍
弟 三 重 要
笫 二 重 要
第 四 重 要
新 間 却




部 同 资 ， 而 純 德 亦 於 兩 层 期 內 出 版 了 兩 期 的 報 紙 。
校 長 沒 科 到 輝 德 的 報 紙 那 找 受 注 視 ， 學 生 受 了 他 的 報 紙 言 論 刺 激 ， 開 始 組 縊 抗 診 行 動




)1 ② 不 能 決 不 應 該 禁 止














！ ) 校 長 對 學 生 還 是 對 家 長 所 负 的 任 大 些 ？
！ ) 校 長 曾 否 答 丨 悪 報 紙 可 以 長 期 出 版 ， 還 是 每 期 出 版 都 需 要 他 同 总 呢 ， ？
！ ) 如 果 校 長 停 止 報 紙 出 版 ， 是 否 會 引 起 學 生 們 更 多 抗 通 ？
當 學 校 的 利 益 受 威 脅 時 ， 校 長 是 否 有 檔 對 學 生 下 命 令 ？
基 在 此 情 況 下 ， 校 長 有 沒 有 言 論 自 由 去 說 ： 不 。
！ ) 如 果 校 長 停 土 報 紙 出 版 ， 他 會 否 防 礙 允 分 討 論 一 些 重 要 問 题 ？
： ！ ) 校 長 的 禁 令 齒 令 輝 德 對 校 長 失 去 符 敬 ？
⑥ 輝 德 是 否 眞 正 忠 心 於 學 校 ， 敬 愛 他 的 國 家 ？
I
⑩ 輝 德 在 報 紙 上 發 衷 他 的 言 論 ， 足 否 防 礙 他 人 的 權 利 ？
⑩ 校 艮 作 一 個 公 了 解 學 校 的 人 ， 是 否 應 該 受 一 些 愤 怒 的 家 艮 影 愁 ？
⑩ 輝 德 是 否 利 阳 報 紙 煸 動 學 生 的 怨 恨 和 ， 不 滿 ？
15
笫 一 重 要
笫 三 重 要
笫 二 重 要
笫 四 重 要
社 [ ； ！ ] 题 意 见 問 卷
笞 案 紙
3
姓 名 ： 7
級 別 ， 敎 育 程 度 ： 編 號 ： 性 別 ： 年 齢 ： 一 — 歲14
贾 汽 車 〔 例 子 〕
乙：似茁驳 5 第二 3”~2~
































第 二 重 要
第 三 茁 耍 第 四 重 要
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